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Cuban:
Points of chapter one:
chapter 2:
Ong says:
Oppenheimer's "Delusional"
Written as a piece to inflame, and published in a popular magazine, this article really bothers me in its alarmist golden-fleece tone. Do I have to respond? Ok, in his inflammatory 1997 piece, Oppenheimer claims that computers are the latest of the school reform emperor's outfits.
Main Theme:
The main theme in both the Cuban and the Oppenheimer piece is that schools are spending too much money on computers for the benefits that computers offer. What they both acknowledge, is that the classrooms they've studied had minimal computer:student ratios, teachers who used the computers in mostly unimaginative ways, and who were mostly untrained and not fluent in their use. Both also made large points about the reliability of the computers used.
The point their arguments make to me, is that schools/teachers are not using computers effectively.
Structure and Support:
Cuban uses mostly second hand accounts and comes to conclusions based on field notes taken by his co-researchers. His writing style is mostly neutralistic and academic. Oppenheimer, writing an article for a mainstream press, uses an alarmist writing style, and carefully chosen snippets from other alarmists (Stoll, Healy, etc.) to give the illusion of support for his points.
My Perspective:
I approached the Cuban article with some respect for his name. After reading the title and cover, I mostly dismissed the book as another Luddite chronicle. The Oppenheimer article I had read before for another class, and summarily dismissed for his heavily biased writing style. While both point out important factors to consider in serious discussion about computers in schools, the "call-to-arms" alarms they sound do not invite a productive discussion. Their cases appear to already be closed.
(Ong):
This was an odd side bar to the others. Ong discusses writing and its roots in and alongside orality. The article seemed balanced and more expository than inflammatory. I don't know what arguments he was making.
Bruner, J. "Two Modes of Thought"
Maxine Greene (1982)
Hawkins (1974)
It was again an interesting challenge to put the four readings together this week. The Greene article begins by defines literacy as a needed aspect of Democracy (Dewey), Self-Expression (Arendt), and Intersubjectivity and Mutual Understanding (Habermas), but shifts from those traits of humanity to a call to prevent "a population passive, stunned, and literally thoughtless in front of a television or with miniature speakers in their ears (329a). She asserts that teachers need to teach fundamental skills, then people must teach themselves, and that part of that is "creating situations that impel people to reach beyond themselves, to act on their own initiatives" (7a). Interestingly, this is the reverse of the process that Hawkins proposes, where "Messing About" is the first stage, then "Guided Messing" and "Lecture" ends it. I suppose that the order is less important than the content/structure of the stages themselves, but I feel that Greene would want Hawkins to add a fourth stage of "Messing About" in his process. Perhaps the fourth stage lies outside the process in the "as needed" part of learning that Greene talks about when encountering the Cézanne painting for the tenth time without saying ""Been there; seen that."
While Greene and Hawkins speak of practice, Bruner talks literary theory, aching to understand the essence of difference between a good argument (exposition) and a good story (narrative). He notes that we look for stories all around us, and suggests that this is a "primitive" trait of us that is "hard-wired" -- demonstrated through the Michotte experiments (18). He touches on Burke's pentad -- I'm curious to explore how they parallel Todorov's six transformations (20,31). Essentially, Bruner is arguing that in a good narrative the sender leaves the story open for the receiver to interpret, but in argument, the sender leaves only one interpretation (24). Narrative is a loose guide, while argument is very structured. I'd argue that Ontology is touched upon when he says narrative creates reality through subjectification (the consciousness of protagonists in a story) (25). Likewise, epistemology is seen through presupposition, narrative guides a search for implicit rather than explicit meaning among a spectrum of possible meanings (25). Ideology is through narrative hiding its fabula in its sjuzet (plot); and methodology is where narrative uses multiple perspective to code a story (26) -- but I've got weak arguments in the latter two cases…
Finally, Cuban continues his odyssey of Silicon Valley by chronicling California's star university, and its forays in classroom technology. It was not until these chapters that I realized that the laser focus of his arguments honed in on computers inthe classroom -- not the role of computers in education. This seems superfluous to me, as I continue more and more in broadening my definition of the classroom far beyond physical walls of a socially-constructed definition of "classroom". Let me insert a reaction here: the typical notion of classroom and classroom education was not designed around computers, so to append it to include them (to stuff computers in the classroom and try to make them work) is like putting a gas tank on a horse-drawn buggy ("cost a lot and ain't helping the horse none!"). It is doomed for failure if we continue trying to make it work in the old paradigm of classroom. Maybe this is the point he will eventually make, but it would have helped if he'd hinted to it early on in the book.
Skrtic ch.1 Theory / Practice and Objectivism: Skrtic outlines the traditional (modern) role of professionalism, and discusses the historical foundations of that role in Western society. He immediately points out that criticisms have been leveled against the argument for professionalism from three waves: "a sociological critique of professional practice, a philosophical critique of professional knowledge, and a political critique of professional power" (3). These three critiques nicely fit in with ontology, epistemology, ideology, and methodology -- as I understand them.
Ontology and Epistemology: The nature of being, according to the modern view of professionalism is "premised on the objectivist view of science" (5), and its legitimacy of its validity (tricky distinctions here) is "premised on the positivist epistemology of knowledge" (9). What Skrtic suggests that this means is that professional knowledge is engaged in a slow crawl towards ultimate truth, replacing false hypothesis with true ones (or at least truer ones -- oops, there's little room for 'truer' in positivism, is there). It's an upgrade belief system, much as I do with cars, computers, and furniture -- get the best I can find/afford, and embrace them until I can get better ones.
Methodology and Ideology: A modern professional, according to Skrtic, "receives applied knowledge from applied scientists" (10). There is a supposedly objective scientific authority that underlies it all. This reception of knowledge occurs alongside socialization -- induction from established professionals who "inculcate inductees with the standards for how members of the profession ought to behave" (11).
Criticisms of Objectivism: Thomas Kuhn vaguely outlined how revolutionary science to requires paradigm shifts (14). For example, the move from Newtonian physics to Einsteinian physics demands a shift from seeing the world as made up from physical matter to one made up of energy (I am not a physicist, so these details may be off a bit). When this shift occurs, the previous authority of objective science is discarded, and a scientist must base their truths/assumptions on new ground. What was true is now false.
Subjectivism: Building off Kuhn's idea of paradigm, subjectivism suggests that the dominant paradigm (Apple's Official Knowledge?) is a result of ideology and power, in that "the victorious paradigm is the one that gets the most converts" (15). It is not neutral. Professional knowledge is then constructed, according to subjectivism (16). Professional induction is also constructed in a "transformation of vision" through socialization, with the blessing coming down from the authority of established professionals ("as professionals in educational technology, people will look to for guidance"). Subjectivism demands suspicion be cast upon objectivism.
Ch 2 Power/Knowledge and Pragmatism
The social sciences sought recognition as genuine sciences by taking up the forms of knowledge the 'genuine sciences' were abandoning (26) (or at least questioning, if not abandoning). In natural sciences paradigms exist serially; in the social sciences multiple paradigms exist at a time which means proponents have to market not only their theory, but also the paradigm that encloses it (27).
I find the use and definition of "human nature" here, rather than "ideology" very interesting. As Skrtic defines it human nature is concerned with human creative power (volunteerism) and pawnship (determinism) (27). Ideology, on the other hand, connotes issues of power between groups and/or individuals. It isn't until the order-conflict dimension of Sociology of Regulation and Radical Change that ideology, as I understood it, is addressed (29). I need help unpacking the four paradigms of Modern Social Scientific Thought, but functionalism smells a lot like capitalism to me (32).
Paradigm Shifts in Social Science: those invested in their research can cling to their paradigm and ignore new ones (33); however, the move from objectivism to subjectivism (which I understand), and the shift to antifoundationalism (which questions the matrix -- which I don't get, unless it's Popkewitz' work on discourse, in which case I completely understand <1% of it, which is a lot), is harder to ignore (34). Continental Postmodernism situates itself outside the paradigm matrix completely, whereas Progressive liberal postmodernism takes modern values as a starting point (much more pragmatic) (37).
Paradigmatic infighting reminds me of the bible story of the Tower of Babel: humans working together to discover god, build a tower to heaven, but become infected with many languages (paradigms?) and can no longer understand each other, so they fight and give up (40). As to Foucault, a friend who's a good nurse suffers from depression, but won't get diagnosed because once officially diagnosed, she would automatically lose a malpractice lawsuit if she screws up -- societal apparatus (the label "depressed") often damns those it purports to help (42).
Cuban
Cuban does not address power relations as an explanation of how teachers use technology. The 'traditional' classroom is a very powerful symbol with little room for computer glitches that take from control (consistency) and omniscient view of the teacher. With less pressure to perform flawlessly outside the classroom, use is greater.
"Functionalism presupposes that social reality is objective, inherently orderly, and rational, and thus that social and human problems are pathological" (67). If the methods are correct, the problems are: inefficiency in carrying out the methods (Ed Admin), and problem students (Special Ed). Diagnosis is useful in identifying and classifying students for placement into tracks that are rationally and technically optimized for them (69). If the system doesn't work for you; you have a problem. Truth is absolute.
Practical Criticism has led first to Mainstreaming and then to Inclusion, which are set against each other in the chapter although neither is described (80). Theoretical Criticism from outside the field includes the view that there is no theory to guide Special Education, the view that it confounds theories (e.g. the pathological view of medicine vs. the statistical view of psychology (81); and the third view that we're just using the wrong theory for it, or defining it too narrowly (82). From inside the field, theoretical criticism includes variations of the external criticisms. The problem is that the functionalist (traditional) view has been ineffectual at best, and harmful at worst (87). But then the problem with theoretical criticism is that it’s foundationalist -- critical but not pragmatic (it doesn't offer solutions) (86). Skrtic suggests that there is a third way -- critical pragmatism (a blending of the best bits of naïve pragmatism and critical incomprehensibility -- I have to admit that it sounds better than naïve incomprehensibility, but will it work?). Skrtic says it entails critical practice and critical discourse (91). It seems to me that these are code words for paying attention to what one is doing, thinking as to whether it or not it is effective, and adjusting methods accordingly. I hope, however, that it's much more complex than that, and that Skrtic didn't waste so many words for such a simple idea.
"The interpretivist paradigm is basically about letting people tell their stories" (105). "We tell our stories to interpret our lives for other people. Upon hearing them, they interpret our interpretations" (105). The result is a nonmonolithic paradigm, with as many versions as people (107). George Herbert Mead's symbolic interactionism connects to Dewey's work. Its phenomenomology means importance is placed on things, as perceived (108). Instead of speaking about reality, an interpretivist study would ask how people speak about reality (109) (interesting that this is still behavior-based, and more specifically linguistic-based -- I wonder what neuro-science adds). This is poignant: "…facts always come clothed in the wardrobe of social conventions" (110). The four tenets of Interpretivism: reality is constructed and intentional; splitting subject and object is impossible; splitting fact and value is impossible (facts do not simply imply value, they are values); the goal of research is understanding (but what is the goal of understanding?). This underlines the power of the census -- one's life, once officially quantified, can make one poor when before she was rich.
I'm quickly learning that this is a fantastic 'Cliff Notes' to many of the names I've been hearing for years. Bordieau's "cultural capital", for example, I knew was used by Apple, but having the names aligned with short descriptors helps tie them together for me. The focus is on societal structures — especially as they relate to power — and their unequal distributions in society (124). The history of Special Education, as outlined in this chapter, causes me to wonder again whether the traditional classroom-based education is set up to fail in this regard. Is a classroom of social order and stability able to flex enough to meet such diverse needs?
Humanists like to open up and understand the black box; they tend to prefer ethical self-regulation rather than external human control; and they believe dominant ideologies cause a gap between appearance and reality [an interesting objectivist term for a subjectivist paradigm]; and finally they're upset because the Enlightenment didn’t live up to its promises (philosophies and broad eras need to stop making promises) (136-8). The immanent critique demands that society reflect one's values -- if it's not utopia, some blame is mine (139). Humanist celebrities include G.W.F. Hegel. Habermas, and Dewey (who is claimed by multiple paradigms) (142).
The post-modern critique says all four of the above paradigms are Enlightement-based, are naïve regarding power relations, use self-consciousness as social control, and place blame where none are to blame (147-8). These are quite interesting to me as I dig further into PostModernism.
Skrtic ch 8: Holism and Special Ed
Defining paradigm as a set of values and beliefs about the nature of reality and knowledge, Lous Heshusius suggests we are moving from a paradigm of Newtonian mechanics that split off the aspect of value to a paradigm that emphasizes meaning (168). The fragmentation that resulted from the scientific revolution is significantly responsible for the mechanistic worldview that permeates through to Special Education (170). Holistic thought, when expressed (rarely) in activities to re-establish body-mind integrity, is still subject to mechanistic assessment standards, and is strongly resisted; instead change is encouraged to consist of a "stronger dose" of mechanistic methods (171). Special Education's grounding in pathology also contributes to its rigid adherence to the Newtonian paradigm (173). The holistic paradigm suggests that reality is constructed; fact and value are inseparable; what we do represents our choices (176). Not only are Epistemology and Ontology connected, but so are Methodology and Ideology -- hence "holism".
Immanent and goal-directed activity by learners within a specific context leads to transformative change (178). The impulse to learn comes from the learner, not through mere exercises (179). The word association examples were great -- I've been there myself.
Principles of Holistic Learning: Learning is immanently active; learning is Understanding relations; Change and progress are transformative; much learning occurs through social exchanges with persons and symbols; assessment equals documentation of Authentic learning processes and learning outcomes; errors are essential and positive activities and should never be punished (this is, I think, a big one); trust and authenticity between teacher and student are essential (185).
Skrtic ch 10: Deconstructing/Restructuring
This was quite difficult to read due to the many references to chapter nine, as well as all the proposals and their authors -- It was difficult to keep them straight. The discourse on Inclusion was further difficult because as one not in Special Education, I was unsure of the terms used (I recall not seeing any definitions in chapter 3). I suppose Inclusion and Mainstreaming are both terms that I should be aware of, but like "back to the basics", it'd be good if Skrtic had defined them so I could see what his definition was. I found definitions on the WEAC website.
Mainstreaming -- Generally, mainstreaming has been used to refer to the selective placement of special education students in one or more "regular" education classes. Proponents of mainstreaming generally assume that a student must "earn" his or her opportunity to be placed in regular classes by demonstrating an ability to "keep up" with the work assigned by the regular classroom teacher. This concept is closely linked to traditional forms of special education service delivery.
Inclusion -- Inclusion is a term which expresses commitment to educate each child, to the maximum extent appropriate, in the school and classroom he or she would otherwise attend. It involves bringing the support services to the child (rather than moving the child to the services) and requires only that the child will benefit from being in the class (rather than having to keep up with the other students). Proponents of inclusion generally favor newer forms of education service delivery.
For the most part, the first part of this chapter is a history of the arguments for and against Inclusion, and seemed to assume a deeper understanding of the issues than was provided in the text. The second half of the chapter was much more interesting (xo me), breaking the topic of school failure into one of discourse on equity, and of discourse on excellence (244). Skrtic compares these two discourses, and blasts them both because they " ultimately retain the assumptions they question" (246) . The contridiction of Public education Skrtic refers to on page 247, is the one between capitalism and democracy. Lucky for us, the terms are merging -- taking on the name of "democracy" and the traits of "capitalism". "Traditional schools cannot accommodate diversity" (249) suggests that there is an alternative. "Achieving the adhocratic ends of inclusive education and school restructuring requires merging theory and practice and eliminating specialization and professionalism, which means eliminating classrooms and uniting theory and practice in multidisciplinary teams of specialists and consumers" (250) -- this stinks of capitalism; sounds like training rather than education.
Social Efficiency (external social reconstruction) and Progressive Education (internal social reconstruction) both addressed valid needs, but Progressive Education purported to fulfill the end results of social efficiency through the individuals' doing, rather than external imposition (255). Skrtic agrees with Reich (1990) saying: "what is needed is" education where "skills and insights add up to something more than the sum of their individual contributions" (258). This is "bottom up" epistemology isn't it? Finally, Skrtic wants to "save democracy from bureaucracy" (259). I guess he doesn't like bureaucracy.
Duguid and Brown "Borderline Issues: Social and Material Aspects of Design"
Brown and Duguid's beginning assumptions are that design can and should go beyond metaphor, and it lends as well as borrows (5). As my poet mentor Bruce Taylor was fond of saying, regarding poetic borrowings: "we're all swimming in the same ocean". Context is not only important, it is unavoidable, and so the authors analyze the center, the periphery, and the border between -- all of which are socially constrained by genre (6).
"Context, not content underwrites interpretation" (6) suggests that D&B's ontology is interpreted by all the experiences one has, rather than only with specific encounters. Designers recognize this, and use cues from people's experiences in their designs. An example of this is the "click" that many digital cameras have. As an electronic piece of equipment, it's not needed, but it turns out that people used the sound in the earlier mechanical cameras as a cue that the picture had been taken. So designers added it to digital cameras. This example also shows the importance of the border region and it's relation to the center. The point in the reading of sound in a machine as being peripheral to most users but being center to a mechanic is also implied in this example (7). Brown and Duguid's epistemology, the "how things are known", seems one of context, or genre — words scrawled on a post-it note carry a different meaning than those embossed on the cover of an annual report (10).
Brown and Duguid speak of four areas where their theoretical border is connected to practice. In engaging interpretation, designers must build in a portable context to enlist the audience's analysis/action (12). It seems to me that portable contexts almost always refer to existing patterns/behaviors. In maintaining indexicality, designers address particular audiences with idexical directions (referring specifically to patterns.behaviors on the periphery, sometimes relying on the medium to provide a context; Brown and Duguid note that relative references can be problematic when removed from the time/space of their referent (14). In transmitting authority, the physical border and its social inertia provide the portable context of authority (16). A 16-volume OED provides a heftier authority, than the Microsoft spell-check. In sustaining interpretation, the physical sense of closure provides a context (17). The given example of a written narrative parallels that in my academic reading of printed PDFs — my patience diminishes as the unfolded pages behind the staple wane.
Brown and Duguiod suggest the continuity (material properties) of the artifact must remain recognizable while the community of practice negotiates and defines its social context (20). Problems occur when merging technology force artifacts to change; yet they must retain a string of continuity lest they alienate their social context (22). They introduce social demassification — the disruption of continuity on social practice — in the example of the newspapers' attempt to move from paper to electronic (24). What's not explicitly addressed here, but lurks beneath the surface, is the ideology of newspapers -- that the social context of the physical newspaper is that it's "the tuna that everyone else is eating", and is therefore socially defined as what's important to people (24). The ideological danger is in reading the newspaper for news rather than for what's perceived as news. I guess the authors do address this in the next section (25). By looking to people as well as internal needs in design, the Washington DC system would have been endorsed by Vygotsky (27). "Design and use mutually shape one another in iterative, social processes" (29). New technologies need not "kill the old", but augment them (30). The authors note that the social construction of artifacts is often ignored (31). Is this merely because it is too familiar to see, and is therefore taken for granted or filtered out?
The specifics I got out of it, after discussion with Huey-Ting, are that for Duguid and Brown, their ontology is a subjective, or inter-subjective one; that is, what is considered real is what communities agree is real through they're epistemology which suggests that not only is it socially constructed, but it is continuously negotiated and renegotiated. The methodology they espouse is one of good design that takes into account the center, the border, and the periphery. After a discussion of ideology, where I felt it was more power (as seen through the effects of the newspapers controlling the news), and Huey-Ting considering it philosophy and discourse (very Foucaultian of her), we decided it's probably a dialectic rather than a dichotomony. We aren't sure where Brown and Duguid stand on this though.
My Fall 2002 "Critical Issues in Educational Technology" with Michael Streibel.
